Heather “Lucky” Penney: [00:00:00] Welcome to the Aerospace Advantage podcast, brought to you by PenFed. I’m your host, Heather “Lucky” Penney. Here on the Aerospace Advantage, we speak with leaders in the armed forces, industry, and other subject matter experts to explore the intersection of strategy, operational concepts, technology, and policy when it comes to air and space power. This week, it’s time for the Rendezvous, our monthly look at what’s happening in Washington, D.C.

when it comes to air and space power, plus important security  trends we should be tracking around the globe. So we’re recording this on Monday, August 31st, so if world events have developed since then, we’ll catch that on the next episode. So with that, I’d really like to welcome Sledge Harmer.

Sledge?

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: Great to be here.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Lazer Lazarski.

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: Hope everybody had a great August.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: And as you know, Sledge and Lazer are two of our Washington insiders. We also have our dean, General Deptula. Sir.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Does that mean we’re not Washington insiders? Anyway, great to be here, and I look forward to the discussion.

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: That was a compliment.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: JV Venable.

John “JV” Venable: I am part of the problem.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: JV, it’s great to have you with [00:01:00] us. And Jen Reeves of our Mitchell team. Jen.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: I’m so happy to be here.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Awesome Boots. Okay, so, Lazer and Sledge, as usual, we’re gonna start off with you, and we’re coming off the August recess. So DC’s back in session, but we’ve also got elections closing in fast. So, talk us through how you think the calendar will work and what that means for the defense bills.

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: Yeah, we’re partially back in, in session. So the House, is coming back today and they’re scheduled to be in session through Thursday, although that may change a little bit. Then they’ll leave, and then they’re supposed to come back, through the end of December, starting the 14th.

So that gives them roughly 12 days, of, actual in session time and then they take off in October for the midterm elections. And we’re hearing, and I’m sure Sledge will, have a comment on this, but there’s a chance that once the House passes its continuing resolution, which they’re supposed to do tomorrow. They may actually recess and then, just, leave for the rest of September through October and come back.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: – Wow, okay.

After the November election. So we’re just not sure right [00:02:00] now. But the priority for the House is passing the FY27 continuing resolution that was passed by the Senate, and that funds the government through the 11th of December, and it was passed in a bipartisan vote in the Senate. And this is, honestly, I think for Sledge and I, it’s the earliest we’ve ever seen a continuing resolution get passed.

And while I’m not supposed to be cheering, and we don’t, you know, we’d prefer to be on actual budgets, having a continuing resolution for defense is much better than shutting down the government. So, it is what it is.. And if the House stays in there’s a, Russia and Iran sanctions bill that they could possibly pass, but my gut feel is, I don’t think the House is gonna be in here very long.

And of interest, to everyone out there on defense, so the Senate’s gonna come back in on the 14th. They’re expected to stay for the remainder of September. They’re gonna vote on, more, nominations to get them confirmed. There is an agreement on Iran War Powers Resolution that passed the House, so they’re gonna vote on that.

There’ll be some hearings. They [00:03:00] may do the Name, Image, and Likeness bill, as well as the CLARITY Act, which is the, crypto digital currency. And then maybe, it would be nice if they finished work on the FISA, you know, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. So those are the, you know, real key things.

But from a defense, there, there are really three areas that we’re watching right now, and I’ll start with good news. So the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act. So this week, we’re starting to see professional staff that are coming back and they’re gonna start in the House Armed Services and Senate Armed Services Committee, they’re gonna start informally conferencing, the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act.

So what they’re trying to do is reconcile the difference between the House-passed bill, which the House actually passed the bill, and then that Senate filed bill with the manager’s package of 86 amendments. And there’s a computer that put side by side, and they’re gonna start working that, section by section to try to get those done.

And initial meetings with the staff directors will begin this month, so they can start setting the timeline and the schedule. And then we also [00:04:00] expect chair and ranking members to meet before they recess or they can get a virtual meeting since House may not be here. But basically, just to talk over the battle rhythm of how to get this bill done.

And the intent is to complete the bill by the end of November, and then have it ready for the floor in December, which, if passed, it’ll make the 66th consecutive year that we pass the NDAA, which is outstanding. Now, the not so good news, you got defense appropriations bills. So as expected, and we’ve talked about this a whole bunch, but Congress is not expected to work on the FY27 approps bills until November, until after the election, and hopefully complete them by the end of December, fingers crossed.

On the Senate side, they haven’t passed any of the bills in committee or sub-committee. And following when we did the continuing resolution, when the House, Senate passed a continuing resolution, and it was, done in a bipartisan way. Chairman Collins, who we thought was going to post the chairman’s marks on the approps bills, has held it back.

We heard that she [00:05:00] may do it in September, but what we’re now hearing is that we probably won’t see the Senate appropriations bills until after the election, so that they could hopefully work some sort of top line agreement and have bipartisan, at least sub-committee, committee bills coming out of the Senate appropriators.

So on the House side, they passed all 12, and they had a few pass on the floor. So where we’re at right now is after we come back from the elections, we’ll take, whatever the House has passed out of the, either the committee or on the floor with whatever top line agreement, and then sub-committee agreements, and they’ll take that to conference, and we’re hopeful, that they can get everything worked out.

So that’s where we are right now. And Sledge, I’ll turn it over to you.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: No, Lazer, that was fantastic. I think you nailed it. The only thing that I would add you, you commented about, it’s kind of a- I guess a mixed blessing that we’re getting a CR, but the fact that there’s no major drama about a shutdown on the 1st October is very [00:06:00]refreshing. When the House comes back like Lazer mentioned, it was a bipartisan passing of the CR. I think it was like 94 to six or something like that in the, or 92 to four in the Senate. So the CR passed overwhelmingly. The Speaker is gonna bring the Senate-passed CR to the floor under suspension of the rules, which means the bill doesn’t have to go to the Rules Committee, which slows it down.

And but it requires a two-thirds majority. So it’s obvious that the Speaker has the votes lined up or he wouldn’t bring it to the floor. So, I think you’re right. I think the House passes it this week. They pop smoke, and we don’t see them until after the midterm election.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Okay, so you gentlemen keep talking about after the midterm election. So how do you expect those outcomes to affect the fate of the defense bills? If it looks like one or both sides of Congress flip what do you think that’ll mean?

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: Wow, that’s, that’s the million-dollar question, isn’t it, Lucky? It’s really hard to make predictions. I, I think the easiest way to look at this is what’s the most likely influence of a different scenario. So I’ll let, you know, let’s say there’s a [00:07:00] status quo where, you know, and this seems to be the most unlikely scenario, that the Republicans maintain control of both chambers. I think that opens the door to budget reconciliation for sure in the, lame duck session.

It also increases the spectrum of a longer-term CR, because they know that they’re gonna be controlling the chamber in the 120th Congress, starting on the 3rd of January. They still have the White House, so they can, they can kind of slow things down. I think if you, if the second scenario is if you have a Democrat-controlled House, but the Senate remains in Republican hands, I think what you’ll see is a lot of pressure out of the lame ducks in the House to push through and clear the decks and get as much done of the House priorities as they can during a lame duck session.

And conversely, if the Republicans hold the House, but the Republicans lose the Senate, then I think you’re gonna see a reluctance on the part of the Senate Democrats in the lame duck session to do anything meaningful, waiting until they can get control [00:08:00] of the majority in their chamber. But really, I think the bottom line in any of those scenarios, it’s really a function of who shows up after the election. I think you’re gonna find a lot of people that didn’t get reelected, especially those that lost their primaries, that may not even come back after they recess, for October, and that makes getting 218 votes, for anything in the House very problematic. But that’s kind of the way I see it.

I think Lazer’s the… You know, you can correct me to 100% on that.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: But this, you know- No … honestly, that just doesn’t sound like good sportsmanship, right? I mean, like, “I didn’t win, so I’m just not gonna show up to work anymore”?

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: Let’s hope that’s not the case.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: No, but I think if past is prologue, I mean, that happens in every lame duck session. And, and my point, my point being is that the, especially for the Republicans in the House, the majority is so thin that it only takes one or two people to say, “You know what? I’m out,” to really make it diffi- even more difficult for the speaker to get anything done.

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: You know, I agree with everything that, that Sledge said. Bottom line is it’s just gonna take, more compromises, you know, if [00:09:00] Everyone’s looking at a likelihood that the House’ll flip, the Senate will stay, but, in election season, all bets are off, and we’re just gonna have to see what’s going on. The other thing that you have to factor in there is we still have a Republican president.

So he’s gotta sign off on these bills, and there’s not gonna be any veto-proof majorities in the House and the Senate. So even though they’ve gotta work some compromises, whatever they have to send up to the president, they’ve gotta sign. So that’s the other play. I I think the key things we’re gonna see is, potentially top-line numbers, you know, some parity of funding between defense and non-defense.

How is that gonna play out? There may be so- I think there’ll be increased oversight if Democrats take control of the House. The other thing I just want to throw in there, we’re looking at committee leadership changes, right? I know that we’re talking about what do we get done by the end of the year, but in November, both the Democrats and Republicans are gonna vote for what, who’s gonna be on the committees next year, and that all gets laid out, and you’re looking at like, everybody in the House is up, but if you look in the Senate, for the Senate [00:10:00] Appropriations Committee, there are five vacancies that are open, mean, Senator McConnell’s gonna be gone, Lindsey Graham’s already gone, Durbin, Shaheen, and Peters. And then if you look at the Armed Services Committee Ernst and Tuberville as well as Shaheen and Peters and, you know, so there’s gonna be changes.

And then there’s also Chairman Rogers. He needs a waiver to stay in the House. So what we’re really looking at, not just who controls the House, who controls the Senate, but what are the committee structures gonna look like next year.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Yeah, no, that’s a really important point. Okay, so what about this one? Supplemental for wartime expenses and reconciliation for for defense.

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: Yeah, secret ballot to Sledge. The I think the odds of passing either a supplemental reconciliation defense is low and that’s at best. And if it’s gonna happen, it could happen during lame duck, and I think Sledge laid it out pretty well.

So let’s look at supplemental, all right? Highly unlikely. Why? ‘Cause I need 60 votes in the Senate, and I’ve got, Democrats that are opposed to all Iranian operations, [00:11:00] so we don’t have the ability to get 60 votes in the Senate, no matter what you did in the House. So thinking that we’re gonna get some type of supplemental, I think is low.

I’m not gonna say impossible, but low. And the other thing is the Pentagon, didn’t do a very good job making its case to Congress, and they didn’t answer all the questions. There were members that wanted to help them, and they were asking for costs, objectives, end state, and they just weren’t gonna get the impacts.

Now, members are aware that the Pentagon’s starting to take measures, you know, to fund, fund the operations, and that’s impacting exercisers, travel, installations, operations. So all that’s happening, and that impacts members. I mean, that’s at the district and state level, but I haven’t seen that tilt enough where we think that’s gonna go ahead and get them the votes they need.

So then we have to look at reconciliation. And all I’ll really say on reconciliation, well, number one, and Sledge, we’ve talked about this before, we’ve all talked, they need to obligate the money that they were given in 1.0, and they haven’t done that yet. And if they don’t do it by 1 October, they get a [00:12:00] sequestration of 8.3%.

I mean, why would you give away that money? So I know they’re working real hard to get it, but that’s stupid. Then they come back and they ask for more money, which, okay, Congress would be willing to do, but you should executed the money that we gave you in the first place. So I mean, that’s…

And the third reconciliation bill, going into lame duck, the priority is passing FY27 appropriations, not the reconciliation, even though that’s less and we really need the reconciliation. But I’ve gotta fund the government, and I think that’s where Congress is gonna put its priority.

If Democrats see that Republicans are trying to wedge in another $300-$350 billion for defense, then they’re gonna be less willing to work on an FY27 approps bills, and that, that’d be a bigger impact. And the last thing I’ll say is, if we can’t get this reconciliation, what do we do with all the money that’s sitting up there in the reconcili- like aircraft, satellites, drones, research and development, Golden Dome, critical munitions. All that’s stuck [00:13:00] up there. Well, I need to pull it… And I say “I,” appropriators need to pull it down, and they’re gonna have to change their approps bill working with, Department of Defense. I mean, if I look at the Air Force, $16 billion, Space Force, $12 billion, w- we can’t let these programs die.

So now what happens? And that’s gonna complicate getting FY27 bills done. So Sledge, to you.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: Yeah, I know. Maybe if I can kind of summarize that there and, and by looking at it in, you know, the big picture, everybody has 1.5 trillion on their brain. They know that’s what, what the administration says they need for national security.

And if you break that up, that’s 1.15 trillion in the base budget request. Congress is marking it just below that, but let’s say 1.1. Then you got 350 billion in the reconciliation, and unfortunately, a lot of the base requirements for the department were put into that reconciliation wishli- list.

And then there’s about another $100 billion in supplemental funding to, the Venezuela operation, what we’re doing. And, and so you [00:14:00] add all those up, and you get really close to 1.5 trillion. We’re not gonna get there. I think the department’s gonna be lucky to get 1.2, and the way they spread things out over the various requests makes it extremely difficult for Congress to put the money in the right place so programs don’t get pulled apart, delayed.

I would hate to be a contracting officer, I guess would be the bottom line there. And then the last thing I’ll say, and I’ve been banging my spoon on my highchair in this podcast for a while now, but I think you’re finally starting to hear people talk about $40 trillion and the national debt and that is gonna start overshadowing any of the conversations we have, right or wrong. The fact that we probably don’t… I mean, the Constitution says, “Provide for the national defense.” It doesn’t say, “Provide for the, general welfare.” It says promote, not provide.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Amen.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: So the priority should be, the priority should be on national security. But at some point you know, we’ve, we borrowed so much from the future for prosperity today that they’re gonna have to start taking a serious look at the [00:15:00] math, and I’m afraid that’s gonna come sooner rather than later.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: No, I, I see that freight train coming too.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): I hesitate to prolong this discussion, but the fact of the matter is, politicians aren’t gonna do one thing about that until the night before our economy collapses. Think about it. They have no incentive.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: Yeah.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Okay, so General Deptula, you just co-authored an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal discussing munitions productions, and for our listeners, we’ll include a link to that in our show notes. But I’d like for you to walk us through that argument.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, you bet, Heather. By the way, it came out in the print version today, so any of you who get The Wall Street Journal rush out and get yourself a copy. Anyway Bill Schneider and I wrote the piece because we think we need to understand that the munitions problem is much bigger than simply saying we need to buy more missiles, more stuff, more ammo. The larger problem is systemic. And [00:16:00] what I mean by that is for decades, whenever the Pentagon needed to save money, munitions were an easy bill payer.

You could cut munitions inventories and production without the political consequences associated with closing a base or eliminating a major weapons program or reducing force structure. That all accelerated after the Cold War, and we allowed a tremendous amount of production capacity to go away. Matter of fact, we didn’t just allow it, we legislated it.

We mandated it. Then we compounded the problem with continuing resolutions that we just spent some time talking about, unstable budgets, and requirements that increasingly became budget-driven rather than strategy-driven. If you don’t have enough money to buy the inventory your strategy actually requires, eventually somebody simply reduces the requirement until the [00:17:00] numbers appear to work.

Unfortunately, that’s exactly backwards. And underlying all of this was an assumption that future wars would be very intense, yes, but relatively short. Ukraine should have demolished that assumption once and for all. Actually, Afghanistan should have, but, you know, Ukraine’s another example.

Modern wars can be extraordinarily intense and prolonged. And we also can’t assume we’re only gonna have one problem at a time. A conflict in one theater may provide an adversary in another theater precisely the opportunity it’s been waiting for. So we need to do three things. First, size our munitions inventories and production capacity against the demands of a prolonged, potentially multi-theater conflict, not against the hope for a short war.

Second, give industry stable, multi-year [00:18:00] demand at economically meaningful production rates, including enough excess capacity to surge when necessary.

Third, and this is probably the most important structural change, we need to stop thinking about the US defense industrial base as ending at the American shoreline. We have extraordinary industrial capacity among our trusted allies. Japan already produces Patriots and has agreed to produce AMRAAMs. Germany can manufacture the Patriot. We’ve cooperated with Germany on the rolling airframe missile for decades, so we ought to be expanding that model dramatically.

And here’s another one that really is, you know, sensitive with the bureaucrats in the system, but something needs to be done about this. And that’s that the Arms Export Control Act and ITAR were designed for legitimate Cold War purposes, that being protecting sensitive [00:19:00] technologies and controlling foreign transfers. And yeah, those objectives remain valid, but a regulatory system designed around controlling individual foreign sales is poorly suited to a world in which we need trusted allies to co-develop, manufacture, and sustain common weapons at scale. Now, AUKUS has already demonstrated that we can create broader exemptions among highly trusted partners. And here’s the strategic bottom line. China has an enormous manufacturing advantage, but China doesn’t have America’s alliance network. So we ought to turn that alliance network into our industrial advantage. We have the technology, we have the capital, we have the allies, and unfortunately, we certainly have the demand, what we lack is an [00:20:00] institutional framework to turn all of that into military production at the scale and speed that we’re gonna need. So that’s it in a nutshell.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Sir, I’m really glad you mentioned AUKUS, ’cause that’s really key to being able to expand our technologies, and we’ve already made the agreements and, security, requirements in order to be able to share the development of many of these technologies. There’s no reason why it shouldn’t, expand to production as well.

JV, I’d really like your thoughts here, because you served at the tail end of the Cold War when we had large stockpiles, and many of them were deployed around the world. So leaders were prepared to fight a large sustained conflict, and using their inventory didn’t put other theaters at risk. But today, I think many are concerned that policy options are being shaped by munitions inventory that’s too small and an ability to rapidly build more. We just don’t have that surge production. How do you see this issue?

John “JV” Venable: That’s a great question, Heather. I’ll, I’ll take a little bit of an issue with one of your lead-ins, and that’s this [00:21:00] two-theater capacity back during the Cold War. We were only fighting the Russians at the time, the Soviet Union, and we had built up stockpiles that served us well going into Desert Storm. But when Desert Storm kicked off, we had roughly 45,000 Mark 82 500-pound bomb bodies that were forward-positioned in the Gulf. We went through those pretty quickly, and, General Deptula’s, what, 42, 43 day war we actually ended up going through almost 85,000 Mark 82s alone in that, the bombards-

Heather “Lucky” Penney: So even sized, we, we ate through that inventory.

John “JV” Venable: I was sitting at Kunsan, Korea, in the soft tower, watching C-5 after C-5 pull up to our bomb dump, taking Mark 82s out of the Pacific Theater and moving them into the fight in the Gulf. And so if you, if you talk about how well we were prepared back then, even then we had issues with inventory.

There was a rule back, during the Cold War, NATO standard was [00:22:00] 30 days worth of munitions stockpiled for a fight with the Soviets. And at that time it was an all-out fight. We would have upwards of 1,200, 1,400 fighters of our own in theater at the end of 60 days, and so lots of munitions going forward. And so however many munitions you think you need, you’re gonna need more. One of the really cool things is, we have several statistical digests here in the States that actually accumulate. You can go in and look at how many JDAMs were produced over the last, oh, well, since its inception, and it’s in the hundreds of thousands, which is really kind of a healthy thing.

I think our number that we can produce every year is in the 40,000s, which is really good. But that’s a munition that requires you to overfly a target, very closely. When you wanna talk about a precision-guided munition, many of those are classified, but let’s just talk about the Patriot missile, for example.

In a week in, Israel two years [00:23:00] ago, w- they went through a- almost 1,500 missiles. Our production capacity at the time for Patriots was 300 missiles a year. Today, that’s gone up to almost 900. That’s in something that we know about. When we’re talking about going and fighting Iran and actually not overflying the targets, the number of JASM missiles, LRASM missiles that we have in inventory, markedly lower than those JDAM numbers, significantly in the thousands, not in the hundreds of thousands.

And so our ability to shoot them is really good. Our ability to reproduce them is on the order of where we are with the, um, with the AMRAAM missile. And so this is a huge thing. It, when, when we go back to General Deptula’s discussion on inventory, production capacity is the second biggest leg in that, and I would argue right now it is the most important thing. And so bringing our precision [00:24:00] long-range guided munitions that we can to bear, that production capacity has got to go up. I support all three points, and sir, tomorrow I’ll bring in my, hard copy of the, Wall Street Journal so you can autograph it for me.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, thanks. By the way, just as a, to add onto your argument, we launched 136 Patriots yesterday against about 35 incoming Iranian ballistic missiles.

John “JV” Venable: Yeah.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): So, how much longer do you do that? A- and by the way, this is a, we use a pause in combat operations. So if you’re launching 136 when there’s a pause anyway, you do the math.

John “JV” Venable: Current production capacity, sir, that’s a, a fifth of our production capacity for the year they fired- Yeah, and we did that in a

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): day

John “JV” Venable: in a day. Yep. Yeah.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Yeah. Amazing. Thank you so much. That’s really good history and perspective and I’m fully agreement with you. Boots, we’re gonna swing over to you because recently, President Trump made news giving the astronauts of NASA’s Artemis II moon mission the Congressional Space Medal of Honor during a ceremony at Johnson Space Center.

So this [00:25:00] comes at a time when a bipartisan group of House and Senate lawmakers introduced the Artemis II Congressional Gold Medal Act to award each crew member Congress’s highest civilian honor. Clearly, what they did is hugely important for the nation. Really like for you to walk us through your thoughts on those awards.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: Well, I’m so excited that you asked because I get to talk about something amazing- … and exciting that just happened. So I think the awards are just, they’re so fitting because what this crew did, what the Artemis II crew accomplished was truly historic. They took humans around the Moon for the first time in more than half of a century, and then traveled farther from the Earth than any humans in history.

I mean, so cool. I mean, an extraordinary achievement for the crew, but remember, not just the crew, but for the thousands of people and the organizations that made the mission possible. So I think that there’s something important about seeing this recognized, I guess, at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, right?

The Congressional Space Medal of Honor recognizes [00:26:00] the award- the extraordinary achievements of the astronauts themselves. But I think what the bipartisan effort happening in Congress, to award them this Congressional Gold Medal, I think that’s even a little broader. This matters for the whole nation.

And from a national security space perspective, right, which is what we really focus on I think we can be really proud of what our NASA colleagues have accomplished because it certainly wasn’t a military mission and it doesn’t need to be one to matter to us. Remember that the civil and the commercial and national security space communities, while we have very different missions, we all pay attention to what the others are doing. And success in one part of America’s space enterprise can reinforce the confidence and the innovation and the partnerships and the ambition across all of the others. And so to sort of sum this up, Artemis II demonstrated that the US is still willing to take on extraordinarily [00:27:00] difficult things in space, and then do them well.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Yeah.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: So that’s good for NASA, and it’s good for the broader American space enterprise, and it’s absolutely something worth celebrating.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: I just love everything that Artemis II did to reenergize, the Moon program and really elevate how important that kind of lunar capability will be to our nation, both from a civil side, as well as a defense and a science side as well. So this is just super exciting. Okay, so Boots, keeping on with, with the space theme, President Trump also announced a US Space Academy. So this is actually really interesting because it’s different than a military academy like West Point, the Naval Academy, or the Air Force Academy, where that’s really about, you know, educating and commissioning young people into the military services as officers, whether or not that’s, you know, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army, the Air Force, or Guardians. But now Guardians will go to the US Space Academy and train along with NASA and other [00:28:00] civil space functions. So it’s really kind of interesting because it’s not a military academy, but it still is something that’s gonna be distinct in terms of where Guardians could actually go. So the actual text stated this entity would develop a professional corps of civically grounded leaders prepared to advance American interests within the space domain.

So we’d really like your thoughts about this because, you know, on one hand, you know, our concern’s that the military space and scientific exploration of space are very different things ’cause we don’t train troops or diplomats or scientists at the same schools for a reason, because there are different skill sets and mindsets in play.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: I mean, I agree with you. I think you put your finger on what concerns me about this, absolutely. I mean, I agree with the premise that we need to have a stronger national space workforce. There’s no doubt about that. More STEM, more people who are conversant in space. Space is in our pockets every day these days, and people don’t understand that. So having better training out there for everybody and a larger core of [00:29:00] people who understand that and work well within it is absolutely necessary. What I am less convinced of is that a single academy will actually get us there. Right? Just a minute ago I mentioned, civil, commercial, and national security space all being part of the same ecosystem.

And that’s true, but they’re absolutely not the same professions. I mean, NASA’s all about exploration and science, and that is righteous and good. The Space Force exists to deter conflict and, when necessary, fight and win in a contested domain. Also righteous, but quite different. And these require some common technical foundations certainly, but they’re very different professional development, professional cultures, and I mean, ultimately, very different obligations.

And you mentioned it, different skill sets and mindsets in play. So then there’s this question of scale. Now, if we do look at it from a military perspective, think about how small the Space Force is very intentionally even as we’re [00:30:00] growing it. So if we have another federal academy, I mean, what does that look like?

How many… We have to ask the question, how many people are we actually trying to produce? What problem are we solving that the existing Air Force Academy, ROTC, universities, all of NASA’s programs and the other pipelines, what aren’t they capable of doing to get us there? So I think the important part about the, executive order that he signed though is that he established a commission to work through exactly these types of questions before the academy actually takes its final form.

So they have 120 days to look at governance, curriculum, service obligations, how it relates to existing federal education programs, and even whether or not additional legislation is required to create it. So I think it’s very interesting- Um, that this is happening. I’m super interested in what this commission is gonna come back [00:31:00] with, and maybe a new academy is exactly the right answer.

But let’s not start with that assumption. I say let’s see what the experts come back with and focus us at that point. Another talking point in several months, for sure.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Well, when that report comes out, if it’s available to the public, we will definitely talk about it again. So, switching over, General Deptula and JV, the Department of War recently came out with a new selected acquisition report highlighting F-35 cost projections. And of course, the headline grabbing number is that the department projects the program will cost just under $2 trillion across its life cycle. But there are nuances that this news, I think, doesn’t really capture, ’cause a caution up front, the total life cycle cost is, in my world, a pretty irrelevant measure but it gathers attention, right?

So this seems like it’s just sensationalism for the purposes of, of getting a headline. For example, does anyone wanna calculate the total B-52 life cycle cost over its 70-plus year history?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): 20 trillion. I mean, let me [00:32:00] just jump in here, Heather. You’re exactly right. And by the way, I wouldn’t call them nuances. I’d call them absurd headline grabbing.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Okay, I was being nice.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Processes and strategic communications to try to tube investment in perhaps what’s one of the most most spectacularly capable aircraft ever designed and employed. So I’d first caution everyone against being mesmerized by that stupid $2 trillion figure, because total life cycle cost is one of the least useful ways to judge the value or affordability of a weapon system. We don’t fund defense programs for 50 or 60 years at a time, so get a grip. Congress appropriates money annually. So the meaningful questions are, what does the aircraft cost to acquire today? What does it cost to operate? Can we afford the force we require? And [00:33:00] most importantly, what operational capability are we getting for that investment?

Now, there’s actually a strange paradox with life cycle cost calculations because the more successful a weapon system is, the worse that headline number can look. Build more airplanes and life cycle cost goes up. Keep them in service longer, and life cycle cost goes up. So by that metric, as you mentioned, the B-52 looks terrible.

Why? Because it’s been operating for more than 70 years and is programmed to operate more than 100. But that’s precisely because it’s delivered extraordinary value over seven decades. Now, the other point getting lost in the headlines is that today’s F-35 is not the same aircraft we bought years ago. TR-3 and Block 4 incorporate major capability improvements, more sensors, computing power, electronic [00:34:00] warfare capability, weapons integrations, and these processing improvements aren’t free.

If you substantially increase the capability of a system, whether it’s an iPhone or an F-35, you should expect some increase in cost. Now, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t drive costs down. We absolutely should, and one of the best ways to do that is stable production at economically efficient rates.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Amen.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Instead, we’ve been jerking procurement quantities around, going from planned buys of around 80, actually up to 100 aircraft, down to 24 in some years. That creates instability throughout the supplier base, and it works directly against affordability. But ultimately, this comes down to cost per effect, not simply cost per airplane.

The F-35 is demonstrating in actual combat that it can penetrate, sense, communicate, [00:35:00]target, and create effects in threat environments where legacy aircraft cannot operate with comparable effectiveness, period. Regardless of how inexpensive they are. So I’d stop debating an eye-catching 50-year accounting number and ask the question that actually matters, “What capability does a nation require to prevail, and what is the most cost-effective way to provide it?”

Over to you, JV.

John “JV” Venable: Yeah, I loved your comments, Boss. This, life cycle is really a big word until you start putting years to it. I think it starts in 1994, and it goes through 2088, which is 94 years. Now, if you were to look at what the F-16, the lightweight- inexpensive fighter was going to be for 20 years or 30 years, it’s right now at 50 years, and if you were to do the math and do all of the cost [00:36:00]leveling in dollar years and the likes, for 50 years, you’re looking at $400 billion.

For 100 years, you’re looking at upwards of $800 billion. That’s for an airplane that can do one-tenth of what the F-35 can do. Going back to your remarks, it needs to be packaged, and it cannot penetrate any kind of high-threat environment. And so if you go into cost per hour, just those metrics, the F-35 is very comparable to the F-15E in cost per hour. And Boss, if you go with your how much does it cost, the F-35 actually costs less to acquire than the F-15EX will. And so the metrics here get really skewed. What you want is coming back to what can the airplane to do and the cost per effect, and the F-35, as p- has been demonstrated in Iran, is unmatched, and we need to continue doubling down on that aircraft.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Exactly. I mean, you just ask any fighter [00:37:00] pilot what airplane they want to take into bad guy land, it’s gonna be the F-35. So JV, you just, mentioned the F-15EX, and I’m glad you did. It’s a nice segue into the new multiyear framework, um, that the Air Force just announced. it’s an IDIQ for $131 billion. Give us more about what you know regarding the details of this deal and why it’s so important that we do everything possible to accelerate aircraft modernization at scale.

John “JV” Venable: Boss, you want to, to start with that?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. Well, Heather, the details are still emerging. So I’d be cautious about getting ahead of what we actually know, but the principle’s absolutely right.

Anything that increases production volume, creates purchasing efficiencies, provides predictability to the supplier base, and very importantly, keeps a hot fighter production line operating, is a positive development. The Air Force has spent far too long pursuing an acquisition strategy of divest to invest.

The problem is that we’ve been very [00:38:00] good at the divest part, but not so hot at getting the investment fielded quickly enough. We’ve retired aircraft on the promise that replacements would arrive later, while buying new fighters at rates nowhere near sufficient to recapitalize the force. And guess what?

Eventually, arithmetic wins. You wind up with units that don’t have a viable replacement path and an Air Force that continues to get smaller and smaller and smaller. So the objective shouldn’t be an artificial debate between F-15EX and F-35 or ultimately F-47. They perform different functions. The objective is to acquire the right force mix at sufficient scale Congress has signaled support for multiyear fighter procurement. The Air Force should seize that opportunity. Industry can’t build c- capacity based upon speeches and PowerPoint slides. It invests when it sees a predictable demand [00:39:00] signal.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: Mm-hmm.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): And we’ve spent decades buying aircraft at boutique rates. Given the security environment we’re facing, we need to move from boutique acquisition to production at scale.

JV?

John “JV” Venable: I love that, that I’m gonna stay out of the boutique business, sir. I recommend everyone do that. This umbrella contract is brilliant. Um, as you mentioned, boss, there’s no way we can buy enough F-35s and future F-47s to catch up with the dying aircraft that we’ve got on the ramps in the United States Air Force.

The only way to do that is by buying F-15Es and potentially buying F-16s that come up, and are coming up for review here shortly, to fill in the holes so that we have actual ramps that are flying fighters and we can actually go to war when we need to, if nothing else, to defend the continental United States from cruise missiles and the like.

This umbrella contract takes us from a little over 100 aircraft to up to 268 aircraft. It will keep the St. Louis [00:40:00] production line going well into the 2030s. And this idea of being able to keep a hot production line that you mentioned is so very critical to us today. The F-35, as brilliant an airplane as it is, cannot come up to speed fast enough with production to catch the regression, path that we’re on with the, the fighter force, and we need these jets now.

I think this is brilliant. I think it sets the stage for, the F-35, a follow-on contract with seven to 10 years potentially, and with the F-47, in, in the future, and maybe even CCAs. But the idea that you have a long tenure, a long, predictable road for not just Boeing, but for its subs to be able to plan, tool, hire employees, and sustain them for the length of period that, that this contract runs, I think is just brilliant.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Yeah. And to, to add to what you both have said, being able to recapitalize at rate and at scale is crucial, not just for having the aircraft and the spares and [00:41:00]repairs and the modernization and all of that, but it’s essential if we’re gonna be able to keep our experienced combat pilots in the service.

Because if you don’t have airplanes, there’s nothing for them to fly. They’re not gonna stay in the service. And if, once you lose that kind of expertise, it takes years and years to be able to build that back. So Boots, the Space Force announced it’s extending the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program a little bit longer.

So terrestrial environmental monitoring from space is really, really important. And Mitchell’s written about this a lot. So can you explain to our listeners why it’s crucial that we move past this legacy constellation as soon as possible? I mean, I’ll be honest, I was really shocked to hear that DMS was getting extended.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: Yep. A- absolutely. Well, I think the first thing that’s really important for people to understand is that military weather isn’t just about whether or not it’s gonna rain tomorrow. That’s not the point. Environmental data affects virtually everything we do, from flying operations and sensor performance to [00:42:00] maritime operations and missile warning and mission planning.

The list goes on and on. If we don’t understand the environment that we’re operating in, we are absolutely starting with a disadvantage. So, and we have to acknowledge that DMSP has been an extraordinary workhorse, but the satellites that are on orbit right now have been there between 17 and 23 years.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Wow.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: And they were originally designed with a five-year lifespan. So, I mean, again, it’s a tremendous testament to the systems and the people that are operating them, but truly this is not a modernization strategy. So what’s exciting about the replacement architecture, and we have designed what this architecture is going to look like, is, well, first of all, that we’re not simply recreating DMSP. We’re breaking the missions apart and bringing in much newer and much more capabilities.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Mm-hmm.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: So we have Weather System Follow-On Microwave, WSFM. That gives us much more precise microwave sensing for [00:43:00] things like ocean winds and tropical storms, whereas the Electro-Optical/Infrared weather system, and that is EWS, um, that guy provides the cloud characterization and the theater weather imagery that our forces depend on.

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: Mm-hmm.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: So keeping DMSP operating while those capabilities come online, now that makes sense, but we need to view this as a bridge and not a destination. We need to get the modern systems operational and into the hands of our warfighters as quickly as we responsibly can.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Yeah. Well, and I think it’s important for listeners to realize, like, we can’t do commercial services to be able to get military weather and do all the services that depend on what DMSP does. A, because, I mean, how many commercial services fly over bad guy land, and B, there are some really unique and bespoke types of information, data, and analysis that these satellites support that are unique [00:44:00] to only the military, right?

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: Absolutely, which is why we had DMSP in the first place, and now it’s just, it is time to move us to the next, to the next iteration, to the next generation of satellites.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: So, General Deptula, the Air Force has been talking a lot about, its proposed Massed Modular Aircraft. What are your thoughts on this?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Well, I think MMA, its acronym- is potentially a very interesting concept, but we need to be very disciplined about defining the requirement before we rush to a solution.

The original MMA concept was essentially an uncrewed, autonomous, long-range, relatively low-cost, standoff weapons truck. It could operate from distant bases, carry standoff weapons, and help generate additional strike missions between what penetrating systems like the B-21 could provide. Keep the aircraft relatively simple and put much of the mission equipment into modular pods.[00:45:00]

That’s a legitimate concept worth exploring. But now we’re seeing MMA discussed in connection with MQ-Next and the requirement to replace lost MQ-9 capacity, and that’s where I think we need to be very careful because these are not necessarily the same requirements. An MQ-9’s a highly flexible sensor shooter.

A long-range missile truck optimized for a Pacific strike scenario is something altogether different Simply because they’re both uninhabited doesn’t make them interchangeable. look, an RQ-4 and an MQ-9 are both uninhabited aircraft too, but no one would suggest they’re substitutes for one another. And we have an immediate capacity problem.

We need sensor shooter aircraft now. The MQ-9 production line is hot, so buying modernized MQ-9s with open mission systems and government reference architecture to restore near-term capacity makes a lot of sense. [00:46:00] Don’t gold plate them. Incorporate modern technology and open architecture, but use them to eat innings while we mature the next generation.

At the same time, continue developing MMA, but make sure we know what problem we’re solving. If MMA is principally a long-range strike platform, then Global Strike Command ought to have a major voice in defining it, along with the combatant commands. If it’s an MQ-9 replacement, that’s a broader and a much different mission set.

Mm-hmm. So my concern isn’t with MMA itself, it’s with conflating two requirements in the interest of moving quickly and ending up with an aircraft optimized for neither. The rule ought to be very simple. Define the operational effect desired first, then design the aircraft, not the other way around.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Well, sir, and I think what you mentioned regarding the timelines, for MMA is also really important because we’re seeing attrition for MQ-9, but we’re also [00:47:00]seeing just a, an insatiable demand across the COCOMs for the capabilities that MQ-9 can provide.

So we’re at a point now where we no longer have the luxury of time to decide or even to develop what the MQ-9 follow-on is going to be. Because if we wait for that, we will have gapped that mission for years.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yep, and it gets even more complicated when you take into consideration, the numbers of MQ-9s are being operated by the Air National Guard, and that, that’s another issue one has to address.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: And we can probably dig into that later. But, you know, because of time, I do wanna switch over to JV, um, because we recently, released, a report on counter UAS, and that report discussed the need to protect air bases. As you know, it’s been going on during Epic Fury, this is a hot topic. What were the main takeaways from Slider’s report? And JV, what’s your assessment of where we are right now?

John “JV” Venable: This, report is a brilliant report written by a [00:48:00] handsome, powerful, and a, a man to be reckoned with, Houston Cantwell. Just a great article about how the bases that we will be flying out of, are not infrastructure, but part of the warfighting system, and we need to defend them. The Army has been, from Key West on to today, they’ve been the number one, defender of our assets, from the, ground-based air defense area. And they have done a good job. Back in the Cold War, air land battle days, they had really good overlapping HAWK coverage, and it was very well integrated.

With the, the Cold War ending, um, through today, that, that capability has really fallen off. And on top of that, our need to disperse our basing in the ACE concept has really come to bear. And so the number of installations and the geographic distance between them has really complicated that process to where we need to develop our own ground-based air defense system.

Not [00:49:00] something that’s really expensive, in Houston’s words, this is something that needs to be, expeditionary. We need to be able to transport it. So you’re talking about automatic, weapons. You’re talking about, missiles. You’re talking about counter-UAS systems, not all of which is kinetic, but also some of the other areas that, that we can get into to where we can actually have hardened aircraft shelters or revetments camouflaged areas to where we actually start incorporating that into our day-to-day thought process.

So it’s basically taking our assets and starting to def- to defend them in a way that we’ve- never really thought about it. The Air Force has made some pretty good steps in the direction. The first is gonna be personnel. This last budgetary cycle, we had a huge increment in people that we added. I wanna say it’s upwards of 12,000 people, 8,000 of which are going to go into the security force area, and I believe that’s going to be into this expanded thought [00:50:00] process of ground-based air defense. So Houston’s paper is absolutely seed corn for where we need to go, and I hope we follow his, the trajectory set out.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Exactly, and he actually had some really interesting ideas that, that could really be wrapped into how we operate, everything from the equipment, JV, that you talked about, being able to coordinate that through the Base Defense Operations Center, which begins to look at base defense, not just simply from a, from a point defense about how do we protect the wire, but really it’s about how do we employ our air superiority offensive counter-air and defensive counter-air to this particular counter small UAS problem set.

So do we need to segment up the bases, much like we do for chem, bio, NBC protection- and have different, mop type levels? How do we respond to that? How do we then train and then exercise our defenders who are taking on this role. And this dovetails really nicely with a report that JDAM did a couple years ago for us on base defense as well, where he was looking at the Pacific problem, and [00:51:00] really sort of reevaluating in the context of how, he expects China would employ their Rocket Force to look at what should we actually realistically expect to our bases, and how could we then see that operating inside that first island chain is a realistic thing if we commit to doing things base defense regarding hardened shelters, like you said, decoys, camouflage, dispersal.

How do we move around so we’re really kind of confounding satellite imagery and things like that. So we’ll include, links to both of those reports in our show notes. They’re both well worth reading. Boots, swapping back over to you. General Whiting, um, recently explained that there are five major things on the US Space Command’s integrated priorities list for 2029 to 2033, and here’s what he said about that.

“This isn’t just a wish list. It’s a clear demand signal to several audiences describing the warfighting capabilities we need to meet our mission, and that includes, everything from integrated space fires, counter-PLEO tech, joint [00:52:00] integrated space command and control, dedicated space domain awareness for space engagements, and sustained space maneuver.”

Help us understand his requirements better.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: Great. I’m happy to do that. Um, but first, I think the most important thing here is to not get lost in those five individual capabilities.

Okay. Mm-hmm. We wanna take them together, because taken together, they tell us something much bigger about how Space Command sees the future fight. So you have to think about that for most of the space age that we have been in, our satellites have operated in relatively predictable ways. We put them into orbit, we carefully manage their fuel, we protect them as best we can.

Mm-hmm. And then we expected them to provide the effects to forces on the ground. Now, what General Whiting is talking about here, he is describing this much more dynamic environment that we really are getting into, where our forces have to be able to find and understand the threats, make decisions very quickly, [00:53:00] maneuver to positions of advantage, and when necessary, hold an adversary’s capabilities at risk.

And oh, by the way, in space. That’s what we’re ta- talking about, is in space. And that’s exactly what Space Command’s new Space Warfighting Environment 2040 describes. It talks about maneuver warfare in space and about maintaining the initiative even while an adversary is actively trying to disrupt us.

So I really like his shorthand for all of this. General Whiting said, “Our space forces need to be able to shoot, move, and communicate, just like forces in any other domain.” And I think it’s perfect, and it’s a pretty profound evolution. So we’re not just talking about making satellites more resilient anymore.

We’re actually talking about building capabilities necessary to fight for space superiority.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Oh, I love that. That’s super exciting, and I can’t wait to see how this continues to evolve and develop and field. General Deptula the Air Force says it wants to put [00:54:00] HH-60 Whiskies at Andrews with the first heli, replacing their Vietnam-era Hueys.

Thoughts on the Muscle replacement?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. Well, Heather, there are really two separate questions here. First, is the HH-60W a sensible replacement aircraft for the first helicopter squadron? And the answer is potentially yes. It’s a proven platform. The Black Hawk family is ubiquitous. Mm-hmm. It has useful payload and performance, and there are obvious sustainment advantages.

But the second question is much more important. Where do those aircraft come from? If we’re talking HH-60Ws out of the combat search and rescue recapitalization program to equip Andrews, then I’ve got a serious problem with that. The Air Force originally had a requirement for 113 aircraft. That was cut to 75, largely to save money, and Congress has been trying to rebuild the inventory. Meanwhile, the CSAR force was already stretched, [00:55:00] and recent combat ops in Iran demonstrated exactly why this mission still matters. You’ll sometimes hear people say CSAR isn’t relevant in a China scenario. Well-

…

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Obviously, we’re not gonna fly an HH-60W over Beijing, but that’s a straw man argument.

There are enormous areas throughout the Indo-Pacific where personnel recovery remains relevant. And more importantly, China isn’t the only contingency the United States military has to be prepared to fight The piece that worries me the most is the human capital.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Oh, yeah.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): CSAR is an extraordinarily demanding mission.

Those aircrews and pararescue men development skills that take years, or they develop skills that take years to build and are really easy to lose if you hollow out the force. So I’m fine with replacing the Hueys at Andrews with HH-60Ws, provided those aircraft are additive. [00:56:00] Don’t solve one legitimate Air Force requirement by taking aircraft away from another force that’s already too small.

So equip the 1st Helicopter Squadron, but don’t do it at the expense of combat rescue. Now, let me push in something. I know we’re running on time. But let me finish with this. Okay. There’s actually a useful theme connecting nearly all the five questions that you asked me today. For too long, the Air Force and the broader department have been managing scarcity instead of building the capacity demanded by our national security strategy. Whether we’re talking about munitions, whether it’s fighters, uninhabited aircraft, combat rescue, the answer cannot simply be moving inadequate resources from one requirement to another one. We need stable budgets, predictable multi-year procurement, higher production rates, allied industrial integration, and requirements based on what it actually takes to prevail in prolonged [00:57:00] conflict, not just what we can put into the next random budget.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Thank you, sir. There’s, that’s a mic drop moment for us.

John “JV” Venable: I was just gonna say amen. Yeah. Just- Yeah … absolutely the perfect finish. Yeah.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: For folks who wanna learn more about the whiskey, we recently did a podcast on CSAR, and so we recommend that you go into our list and go take a listen at that, because it is an excellent summarization of not only the mission, a little bit of its history, but why it’s so crucial, not just to today’s operations, take a look at Dude 44, but for future operations as well.

So Boots, we’re gonna s- spin off with you. President Trump signed a memo to drastically increase the number of US commercial space launches, commercial space launches, including directing government agencies to look at federal land for new launch and re-entry sites, and they’re talking at least 1,000 launches and re-entries annually by 2030, which is seriously up from 178 launches last year.[00:58:00]

What’s the context to all of this?

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: Okay. Well, no, certainly the 1,000 launches and re-entries a year, that is very attention getting. I think really what the bigger story is that we’re starting to treat space access as infrastructure rather than this series of, like, extraordinary events as it’s been for years and years.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Okay.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: So then we have to talk about that if we’re serious about these proliferated architectures in space, about rapid reconstruction, about commercial space, and eventually sustained operations beyond Earth, we simply can’t operate with a launch enterprise that was designed for a much smaller space age.

We have to expand. We need the ranges, the launch sites, the spectrum availability, airspace management, and the regulatory processes that can support a dramatically higher tempo. And there’s a real national security implication here. It’s not, I mean, resilience isn’t just about putting more satellites in orbit.

If we lose capability in a conflict- Mm-hmm … how quickly can we [00:59:00] replace it? Do we have the access to do that? Launch capability becomes part of our combat power. So I don’t think the eventual number of 1,000 is really the point. A- again, certainly attention getting, but the direction this takes us absolutely is the point.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: No, that’s a great lesson learned and insight. I mean, I think, you know, if we look at, , Charles’s, dynamic space operations paper, he points in this direction. So it seems like it was very prescient, and I get what you’re saying about that sort of ability to reconstitute, , and then also have that adaptability and resiliency across the entire space architecture.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: 100%.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: All right, folks. Well, that’s all we got for now. I know you’re all thirsting for more, but, , we’ll have to put it off till next month. So thank you so much for making the time.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. Well, that was a lot, Heather. That was a, a good session. And, , to all our audience, have a great Air and Space Power kind of day.

Anthony “Lazer” Lazarski: Great being back.

Jennifer “Boots” Reeves: Hey, thanks so much for having me again. I love doing this.

John “JV” Venable: Yeah, wonderful. A great discussion.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: Thanks for having [01:00:00] me.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: And with that, I’d like to extend a big thank you to our guests for joining in today’s conversation. I’d also like to extend a big thank you to you, our listeners, for your continued support and for tuning in to today’s show.

If you like what you heard today, don’t forget to hit that like button or follow or subscribe to the Aerospace Advantage. You can also leave a comment to let us know what you think about our show or areas that you would like us to explore further. As always, you can join in on the conversation by following the Mitchell Institute on X, Instagram, Facebook, or LinkedIn, and you can always find us at mitchellaerospacepower.org.

Thanks again for joining us and have a great Aerospace Power kind of day. See you next time.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): This gigantic Goliath grouper and it does a 180, it comes back at me and it literally was, m- man, I hope it doesn’t bite me. I mean, when you see the video, Jen, you’ll, you’ll freak out ’cause he comes, he g- comes so close, I actually shove him away.

John “JV” Venable: Oh, wow.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. So. Oh, [01:01:00] wow. Anyway, and if they weren’t illegal, he would’ve been-

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Would’ve been dinner …

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): , it would’ve been dinner. Oh,

John “JV” Venable: yeah.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Dinner for many days ’cause it was about a 50, 60 pounder.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: Yeah.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: Wow.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): So.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: That would be something to haul into the boat.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. I’ve, I have shot- That would be work … a 282 pound Warsaw grouper before, and that’s another story.

Took three people to get it in the boat.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: That’s a big fish.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: It’s a big fish story.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. It could’ve eaten son Dave at the time. He was, he was like three.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: That’s crazy. Makes a lot of tacos.

Okay. I like the themes, guys.

John “JV” Venable: What’s the deal with the eagle behind you, Viper driver?

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): He’s an Eagle driver. Don’t give him any shit. No,

John “JV” Venable: he’s not.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): No, he’s… One of the things that made this guy, now he’s, he may not remember this, but one of the- Oh, I remember

John “JV” Venable: it ’cause we were crossing the bridge across the bay.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. Well, you got a good memory. Taking the, yeah, Sandesten, yeah. I, you know, I asked him about being an F-16 driver, and he goes, “I’m not an F-16 driver. I’m an [01:02:00] F-15 driver.” And I thought to myself, “Holy shit, this guy has his priorities right,” ’cause he had just taken over as the wing commander- Ah … at the 33rd Wing.

Yeah. So I still remember that, Sledge.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: Well, and, and the second part of that was, , I’m a poster child for persistence because it took me 22 years to get what I wanted out of pilot training. Yeah.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): There you go. How many

John “JV” Venable: hours did you get in?

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: I had ended… I had 157 when I wrapped up.

John “JV” Venable: Yeah.

Todd “Sledge” Harmer: I, I was, I was the low-time guy in the wing the entire time I was there.

Yeah.

Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): But what a great attitude. That’s a leadership lesson.