



# STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

*STATE OF THE  
AIR FORCE AND  
SPACE FORCE*

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July 2025*

# Overview

- **Threats & Principles**
- **State of the Air Force**
- **State of the Space Force**
- **Priorities for SECAF Meink**
- **Bottom Lines**



# *Threats & Fundamental Principles*

“The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war.”

*2024 National Defense Strategy Commission*

<https://vimeo.com/1078302228/3face8a733>



**China's DF-21D**

- **Threats, fiscal, and political realities demand DOD focus on what matters most:**
  - Building a strong military to accomplish:
    - Competing with peer adversaries
    - Strengthening alliances and partnerships
    - Protecting global access
    - Providing nuclear deterrence
    - Realistically adapting new technologies

# ***However: The Air Force is in a Force Structure Nosedive***

***Today, the USAF is the Oldest, the Smallest, and the Least Ready in its 78 Year History...***

***At the same time, the Chinese AF is the newest, largest, and most ready in its history***

- **Not a criticism, but a fact...**
- **Multiple administrations cut the Air Force to net a “peace dividend” and later to fund the Army's COIN strategy**
- **There was a recapitalization plan, but...**
  - OEF, OIF and OIR dramatically altered this plan
  - Army received \$65 Billion a year more than the AF for 20 years post 9/11—a total of \$1.3 Trillion more than the AF...
  - The Air Force was downsized to provide offsets for the Army
  - F-22s canceled; KC-46, B-21, F-35 delayed; F-35 rate reduced
- **Legacy aircraft are at the end of their structural lives...**



PLAAF H-20



**The USAF is programmed to lose more planes over the next five years than it will replace—continuing its decline...**

# The Numbers Tell the Story


- **Airmen are undertaking missions with aircraft that average well over a quarter of a century in age**
  - KC-135 tankers and B-52 bombers pre-date the Cuban Missile Crisis (“youngest” B-52 today is over 63 years old!)
  - F-15, F-16, and A-10 date from the Nixon & Ford days
- **The 2020’s are a make-or-break window**
  - Legacy airframes are increasingly non-survivable
  - F-22 and B-2 face longevity challenges as high-demand, low-density assets
  - F-35 procurement is well below requirements
- **10 aircraft types first flew over 50 years ago**
  - **Those 10 aircraft types account for over 2,600 Air Force aircraft or two-thirds of its entire force**
- **In comparison, the Navy has only one operational warship on duty over 50 years old**

Aircraft	Average Age*
A-10	43 years (72) 53 261
F-15C	39 years (72) 53 127
F-15E	32 years (86) 39
F-16C	34 years (74) 51 862
F-22	17 years (97) 28 183
F-35	6 Years (06) 19 469
B-1B	38 years (74) 51 45
B-2A	30 years (89) 36
B-52H	63 years (52) 73 76
KC-10A	Retired
KC-135	63 years (56) 69 325
KC-46	4 years
U-2	41 years (55) 68 27
C-17A	21 years (91) 34
C-130 (cargo)	22 years (54) 71 406
T-38C	57 years (59) 66 495
AWACS	44 years (75) 50 15


\*(Year of 1st flight); yrs since first flight; inventory)

**While AF recapitalization has been on pause for 30+ years, the rest of the world continues to evolve.**

# Current State of the Force: Fighters




# Current State of the Force: Bombers




# *Key Trends All In the Wrong Direction*


## Fighter Squadrons



## Flight Hours per Month




## Average Fighter Age



Data from ACC


# USAF in Desert Storm (1991) Compared With USAF of Today

- Air Force rated “Very Weak” in 2024 Heritage Foundation assessment
- The average age of Air Force aircraft today is over 31



***Despite over 30 continuous years of combat, no enemy has done as much to harm the Air Force than the impact of arbitrary spending restrictions...***

# *Inverse Relationship Between Aircraft Average Age and Readiness*



\* Overall Readiness represents composite result of inventory size, MC rates, effects of sustained surge/deployed ops on acft service lives, training, and personnel/retention

# ***Space Force Challenges***

**The U.S. Space Force is underfunded; undersized; and without the authorities to consolidate DOD space agencies.**

- **Funding:** USSF is only three percent of the DOD budget—it can't do its missions to deter or defeat threats in space without more funding.
- **Personnel:** The USSF is half the size of the Coast Guard, yet space expertise is required to support the space force, space command and the individual services unique space requirements.
- **Organizational authorities:** “Our national-security space program is spread across more than 60 departments and agencies, resulting in a glaring lack of leadership and accountability that undermines our combatant commanders and puts our war-fighters at risk.” (2019 VP)  
Only one agency has been integrated into the Space Force (SDA).

***“We need a Space Force to deliver critical space effects for the conduct of joint military operations, and that can protect U.S. and her allies from space-enabled attack and this new mission requires new resources”***

***Gen Chance B. Saltzman, CSO***

# ***Impact of FY 2026 Budget on DAF***

- **Air Force suffers a 1 percent budget *cut* equals actual 4 percent budget *cut* after incorporating 3 percent inflation 184.1 (26); 188.1 (25)**
- **The Space Force's requested budget is a 9 percent *cut* from the 2025 request and with inflation is a 12 percent budget *cut* 26.1 (26); 29.4 (25)**
- **The Space Force funding not aligned to the threat or mission demands**
- **The 2026 budget request cut 340 aircraft while buying only 76**
- **Over the next five years the Air Force loses more aircraft than it buys**
- **Perennial 2000 pilot shortage—fewer planes make the problem worse**
- **Spending on the Air Force was less than Army from 1994 to 2023 (30 yrs) and less than the Navy from 1970 to 2025 (56 yrs)**
- **Correcting these shortfalls requires increased awareness of the facts by Congress, OSD, and the public**

**The AF is in a death spiral—retiring more aircraft than it buys will eventually collapse the AF. SF not growing fast enough.**

# *Priorities For SECAF Meink*

## **Macro Objectives**

- 1. Reverse the decline in Air Force readiness and force structure.**
- 2. Resource the Space Force to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy**
- 3. Urge transparency in DOD budget reporting: Move the \$51.5 Billion pass-through now shown in the Dept of the Air Force budget to where it actually belongs—“Defense-wide spending.”**



**“The Air Force requires significantly more resources to expand both its capacity and its capabilities”—2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy**

# ***Priorities For SECAF Meink (1/2)***

## **The Most Critical Priorities to Achieve Those Objectives:**

- Fully fund the NGAD penetrating combat aircraft (F-47)
- Raise the annual buy to 74 F-35s and 24 F-15EXs
- Ramp B-21 acquisition to 20 per year by 2030.
- Restore readiness. Increase fighter pilot flying hours to of 200 hours/yr
- Fully fund Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) requirements.
- Aggressively pursue AI/autonomy realizing it has promise but we will still require both piloted and uninhabited aircraft—stay the course with CCAs.
- Build a stockpile of conventional precision munitions in advance of conflict. The defense industrial base is unable to adequately respond to crisis.



# *Priorities For SECAF Meink*

- Fully fund Space Force programs designed to achieve space superiority
- Increase personnel in the Space Force
- Consolidate all DOD space agencies into the Space Force to assure unity of military and space intelligence operations, reducing duplication and waste.
- Establish a national nuclear deterrence fund separate from the Air Force and the Navy service accounts to ensure necessary funding is not offset from conventional forces.
- Fully fund the Sentinel program to begin replacing the Air Force's obsolescing Minuteman-III ICBMs and their launch facilities by 2030
- Initiate development of the Next Generation Air Refueling System (NGAS) with initial production target in the 2030s.



**“The Air Force requires significantly more resources to expand both its capacity and its capabilities”—2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy**

# ***Bottom Lines***

- **Today's U.S. military personnel are the finest in the world. But without the proper tools, training and capacity, their talents cannot be realized.**
- **The Department of the Air Force is too small, too old, and not ready to execute the national defense strategy**
- **On its current vector—without a significant increase in funding the situation will only get worse.**
- **The cost of the effort to begin recovering the Air Force's decline and adequately fund the Space Force will require an increase of at least \$45 billion annually.**
- **Without fixing the United States risks losing its next war.**

**The only thing more expensive than a first-rate Department of the Air Force is a second-rate Department of the Air Force.**



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[www.mitchellaerospacepower.org](http://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org)



# STRATEGIC CHALLENGES


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# Comparing Service Budget Shares




**AF Has Been Chronically Underfunded Relative to the Army and Navy For Over 30 Years but masked by passthrough**

# “...to provide for the common defense, Promote the general welfare...” Is that still true?

1966


**Mandatory** 26%  
**Discretionary** 67%  
**Interest** 7%



■ Social Security    ■ Health Care    ■ Other  
■ Defense    ■ Non Defense    ■ Net Interest

1991


**Mandatory** 50%  
**Discretionary** 44%  
**Interest** 6%



■ Social Security    ■ Health Care    ■ Other  
■ Defense    ■ Non Defense    ■ Net Interest

2016

**Mandatory** 62%  
**Discretionary** 31%  
**Interest** 7%




■ Social Security    ■ Health Care    ■ Other  
■ Defense    ■ Non Defense    ■ Net Interest

2026\*

\* CBO  
estimate

**Mandatory** 65%  
**Discretionary** 22%  
**Interest** 13%



■ Social Security    ■ Health Care    ■ Other  
■ Defense    ■ Non Defense    ■ Net Interest

# ***Reconstructing the Air Force America Needs***

[https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2025/02/Air\\_and\\_Space\\_Vectors\\_Policy\\_Paper\\_59-WEB.pdf](https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2025/02/Air_and_Space_Vectors_Policy_Paper_59-WEB.pdf)

## **1. Fully fund the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) penetrating combat aircraft (PCA).**

Cost estimate: Resume \$3-4 billion per year in the budget as originally planned to keep this program on track.

## **2. Increase F-35A acquisition to 74 per year as quickly as possible.**

Cost estimate: \$3.7 billion for an additional 32 F-35A per year.

## **3. Increase F-15EX acquisition to 24 per year and grow the planned inventory to 225.**

Cost estimate: \$3 billion for an additional 24 F-15EX per year.

## **4. Increase B-21 acquisition to 20 per year by 2030.**

Cost estimate: \$5.2 billion for ten more B-21s per year and a \$4–5 billion one-time cost to stand up a second B-21 production line.

# ***Reconstructing the Air Force America Needs***

## **5. Fully fund the Sentinel program to begin replacing Minuteman-III ICBMs by 2030 as planned.**

Cost estimate: An additional \$5–8 billion over the FY 2026–2030 future years defense program (FYDP).

## **6. Establish a National Nuclear Deterrence Fund.**

Cost estimate: Reduction of \$5–8 billion out of DAF budget over FY 2026–2030.

## **7. Increase the Air Force's combat fighter pilot flight hours to 200 per yr.**

Cost estimate: An additional 4.95 billion to bring flying hours up to/sustain 200 hours per fighter pilot per year.

## **8. Fully fund the Air Force's Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) account to support 200 flying hours for fighter pilots each year.**

Cost estimate: An additional \$11.15 billion annually to sustain 100 percent of the new flying hour support requirements.

# ***Reconstructing the Air Force America Needs***

## **9. Increase funding to rebuild critical munitions inventories.**

Cost estimate: \$1 billion, ramping to \$2 billion per year as industry increases its munitions production capacity and new weapons enter production.

## **10. Add funding to the U.S. Air Force for air base air and missile defense.**

Cost estimate: An additional \$1 billion annually.

## **11. Fund at least 26 E-7s as the Next-Generation AEW&C Capability.**

Cost estimate: An additional \$5.12 billion annually between 2028–2032.

## **12. Initiate development of the Next Generation Air Refueling System (NGAS) with a target of beginning initial production in the mid-2030s.**

Cost estimate: An estimated \$300 million in RDT&E per year beginning early in the next FYDP would provide seed money to develop NGAS without impacting these other critical modernization programs.

# ***Setting Up the Space Force for Success***

## **1. Field Advanced Space Control and Counterspace Systems.**

Cost estimate: Ramp from \$1.5 billion in 2026 to \$5 billion in 2030.

## **2. Expand Space Domain Awareness and Battle Management Capabilities.**

Cost estimate: Ramp from \$0.75 billion in 2026 to \$3 billion in 2030.

## **3. Enhance Space Access and Launch Capabilities.**

Cost estimate: Ramp from \$1 billion in 2026 to \$3 billion in 2030.

## **4. Expand Space Force Military Personnel End Strength.**

Cost estimate: An additional \$1 billion annually between 2026–2030 for increased military personnel costs.

## **5. Develop Cislunar Space Operations Capabilities.**

Cost estimate: An additional \$0.25 billion per year between 2026–2030.