052218 Air Force Association, National Defense Industrial Association and Reserve Officers Association Capitol Hill Seminar with Joe Bosco, Senior Associate at the center for Strategic and International Studies; and Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, on "The North Korean Nuclear and Missile Puzzle" (For additional information on AFA/NDIA/ROA seminars contact Peter Huessy at phuessy@afa.org).

MR. PETER HUESSY: Good morning, everybody. Today we have two extraordinary speakers. Bruce Klingner is from the Heritage Foundation and has just come from, not only around the world and talking to some North Koreans and South Koreans, but he likes to scuba dive and he's been scuba diving in cages surrounded by white sharks. He has pictures on his phone, in case you'd like to ask him about it.

Joe Bosco was formerly with OSD and formerly CSIS, and is going to be our second speaker, to talk about not only the North Korean-U.S. summit coming up, but how do we deal with this missile and nuclear weapons conundrum on the Korean Peninsula? What's the role of the United States and China?

We're not going to have another event until after Labor Day. We have General Raymond speaking from Space Command on the 24th. That's at AFA national. It's our big event, but he'll be speaking.

Then we'll have Rebeccah Heinrichs and Matt Kroenig, who are going to speak on the 5th of June. On the 8th June we have General Thompson from the Los Angeles Space Command. He also is going to be having a post-seminar roundtable for invited guests. If you'd like to attend, let Nikki know as well.

Bruce, on behalf of the Air Force Association and the Mitchell Institute, thank you for coming and talking to us today. Joe, thank you for coming. Joe will lead it off. Will you give a warm welcome to Joe Bosco?

(Applause).

MR. JOE BOSCO: Thank you, Peter. It's a pleasure and a privilege to be here with this distinguished audience. The only sharks I dealt with were when I was at OSD. That was good training.

It seems that almost on a daily basis we witness new developments in the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis. I wrote these remarks last night. I haven't checked my Twitter feed this morning, so I don't know if they're still valid.

But there are a few basic elements that have remained steady and pretty much predictable throughout the quarter century of talks and sanctions and mutual threats. The first unchanging reality is that Kim Jong-un has no intention of giving up his nuclear and

ballistic missile programs, unless he receives an offer he simply cannot refuse. That offer would involve a very big American carrot and a very big American stick.

President Trump has just placed both on the negotiating table. He promised Pyongyang that if it gets rid of its nuclear weapons the United States will ensure that the North Korean people can enjoy the same economic prosperity and development that the South Koreans have achieved. In addition, the president offered an almost unprecedented guarantee of regime security. The United States will pledge not to attack North Korea and decapitate the criminal Kim regime, though the president didn't use the term criminal, as he has in the past.

The security guarantee is almost unprecedented, but there is an historical event that presents an interesting parallel. In 1962, as part of the deal that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy committed Washington to never again try to overthrow the communist regime of Fidel Castro, as it had during the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In exchange, the Soviet missiles would be removed from the island.

That brought the world back from the brink of nuclear war, which is also where the United States, North Korea, and potentially the People's Republic of China seemed to be heading just a few short months ago. It is also the point that we may be returning to if the Trump-Kim summit falls as flat as all the other efforts have over the past 25 years. The calendar will then roll back to the period prior to the winter Olympics, when military conflict seemed imminent and there was talk of pre-emptive strikes and bloody noses.

There's one other similarity between the Cuban Missile Crisis and today's North Korean nuclear confrontation. In 1962 the other thing Premier Nikita Khrushchev demanded was that the United States withdraw its own NATO missiles from Turkey and Italy, something the Soviets had wanted from the day the NATO missiles were deployed. By putting their own missiles in Cuba, the communist superpower had created something to negotiate about and to trade off, and it worked.

Today North Korea is trying a similar gambit. It wants U.S. forces off the Korean Peninsula and the end of the U.S.-Republic of Korea security alliance. It cannot demand that Washington withdraw its deployed tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, because we already did that unilaterally in the early 1990s.

President George H.W. Bush believed that if he took the first step in showing good faith, North Korea would abandon its own nuclear program. This would supposedly also win the support of communist China, North Korea's senior partner, which had been urging Washington to make that concession as the way to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Once we did it, however, Beijing lost interest in the subject.

Which brings us to the second reality that underlies the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis, and has from day one, the duplicitous enabling role of communist China. Even as Beijing was pressuring Washington to pull America's tactical nukes out of South

Korea, it was funneling nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan network. From there, it found its way into the hands of nuclear scientists in Pyongyang, Tehran, Tripoli and other places inhabited by aggressive dictators who shared the Chinese communist hostility towards the United States.

Those rogue regimes and terrorist states then proceeded to exchange components and technical know-how among themselves, and they continue to do so today. That makes China not only the world's leading proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, but a proliferators of other proliferators. Beijing continued its successful double game over the next 20 years, through the Clinton, Bush II and Obama administrations. While always claiming to be opposed to North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, it continued to provide the essential technical assistance and diplomatic support that kept those programs going.

Along with Russia, it also blocked or weakened United Nations Security Council resolutions that would have imposed punishing economic sanctions on the successive Kim regimes. And when U.S. and international pressure finally shamed China into voting for at least some sanctions, they simply declined to enforce them, or found ways to help its communist ally get around them. We might as why Beijing continued to play this enabling role for North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and whether it has now stopped doing so?

Despite the repeated professions of Asia experts from Henry Kissinger on down that North Korea's weapons and missile programs were certainly not in China's interest, Beijing begged to differ. It found them to be a huge diplomatic, economic, political and even military bonanza that achieved the following advantages for the People's Republic.

One, the North Korea problem distracted U.S. diplomatic attention and military planning, and diverted assets and resources from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other counter-terrorism challenges. Number two, it strained American public support for overseas commitments. Number three, it brought periodic infusions of Western economic aid that helped China keep its junior partner in power, preventing an economic collapse that would have resulted in a unified democratic Korea.

Four, it hindered U.S. counter-proliferation efforts with Tehran and the spread of dangerous technology to other anti-Western regimes, and potentially to terrorists. Five, it won China enormous prestige as, quote, "a responsible international stakeholder" working within the Six Party Talks and other negotiating forums, supposedly to contain North Korea's nuclear activities. And six, it greatly enhanced Beijing's negotiating leverage with Washington on trade imbalances, currency manipulation, Belt and East China Seas, Taiwan, and China's human rights record. China became the indispensable partner we could not afford to offend.

Has China finally mended its ways and decided to rid the world of the North Korean threat? Trump administration pressure has certainly brought it around to at least partial cooperation. But we have fresh evidence that Beijing has not yet gotten the full

message.

For almost 30 years it has told Washington that the North Korean issue is a bilateral one for America to resolve, and not to put the onus on China despite its unique role as Pyongyang's economic lifeline and military backup. So President Trump's policy of maximum pressure finally got Kim's attention, and he says he's ready to negotiate a denuclearization deal, whatever that may mean in his mind. Good news for the region and for the world, but not for China.

Suddenly Xi Jinping takes an active interest and decides to throw a monkey wrench into the proceedings. He summons Kim to Beijing twice to discuss negotiating strategy. Kim then suspends further talks with South Korea and threatens to cancel his meeting with President Trump.

Pyongyang blames the disruption on the joint U.S.-Republic of Korea joint exercises that North Korea had previously said were not a problem. No one takes that excuse seriously. President Trump has speculated that China is influencing Kim to back away.

What would be Xi's motive? One possible explanation is that China sees the real possibility of an agreement between North Korea and the U.S. That would mean the nuclear threat would disappear, taking away all the benefits and advantages and leverage it has given to Beijing for decades.

We would no longer hear American officials advising that we should not get too tough with China on trade or Taiwan or the South China Sea or human rights, because after all, everyone knows we need China's help on North Korea. Another possible rationale for Beijing's subversive intervention is that it sees the potential for an even worse scenario, that Washington is really after regime change in North Korea. That is certainly not an unreasonable conclusion, after all the president's recent emphasis on North Korea's human rights situation.

In the space of a few month he gave three major speeches on this subject: before the South Korean National Assembly, the United Nations, and the State of the Union address, which featured a disabled North Korean defector defiantly waving his crutches to demonstrate the Kim regime's cruelty. That was followed by a long emotional televised meeting in the Oval Office with a group of North Korean escapees, men and women who detailed their gruesome treatment at the hands of the Kim regime.

Earlier statements by Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and National Security Assistant John Bolton, before those two advisers took office, reinforced the administration view that the Kim regime is not fit to govern and should be replaced. That would explain the president's haste to assure Kim that he would receive U.S. security protections along with economic bounty.

In conclusion, it seems clear that the Trump administration's campaign of

maximum pressure on North Korea is working. It would be a strategic mistake to remove it before it achieves the desired results. In fact, given China's perfidious role in creating and perpetuating the North Korean threat for the past 25 years, the maximum pressure campaign should be intensified against Beijing as well.

Thank you.

(Applause).

MR. BRUCE KLINGNER: It's good to be back here. I've been speaking to this group for I don't know how many years, and we still haven't solved North Korea, so I'm not quite sure why Peter keeps bringing me back. It has been really quite a busy year, and actually the last several years, given the rapid pace of North Korean nuclear and missile tests and then the uncertainty of what the new U.S. administration's policy will be. And then this year kind of the whiplash effect of going from talking about war on the peninsula to now talking about peace or another diplomatic resolution.

When they were doing all of the missile tests my wife would ask me, when I was going off to do an interview, what are you going to say differently this time? I'm like, nothing really, but they still want people to come on and talk about it. So it certainly has gotten the attention and kept all of us Korea watchers quite busy.

So right now we have this sort of stunning change of going from the brink of war to the brink of peace, perhaps. How did we get here? In a way, right now everyone is claiming credit.

You've got the hawks, the doves and the pythons. The hawks will say it was the threat of preventive attack, the threat of initiating an all-out war on the peninsula, that brought Kim to capitulate, to the table. The doves will say we've been advising you for 10 years to go back to the negotiating table, and you've finally listened to us. The pythons, who advocate squeezing North Korea with sanctions and targeted financial measures will say it's really only in the last two years that we've done stronger UN and U.S. sanctions, as well as going after North Korea's illegitimate business partners.

The maximum pressure, though, is not maximum. There's still many things that the U.S. is pulling its punches on, particularly enforcing U.S. law against Chinese entities that are violating U.S. laws and coming into the U.S. financial system. We just saw with ZTE the U.S. is backing off one of the few Chinese entities that it had sanctioned.

But even collectively all three of those, and it's probably a combination of the three, in a way that's too U.S.-centric a view. You have a different South Korean president. You have the impeachment of a conservative president and replacement with a progressive president, Moon Jae-in, who is going to be far more eager to engage with North Korea, far more receptive to any kind of North Korean outreach. He's going to be looking to resume the policy of catapulting bags of cash to the North as a way of lowering tension on the peninsula, and North Korea would know that so they would be

more likely to reach out to him than to his conservative predecessors.

Also, Kim Jong-un does seem different from his father. We've seen more of a boldness, a decisiveness, both on the really ratcheting up the tensions, as well as really pushing to cross the finish line on a number of different missile programs and several nuclear programs. But now doing the diplomacy, the charm offensive, which for North Korea always tends to be more offensive than charming, but he's also doing that kind of on steroids compared to how his father would do it.

The father would usually go after one country at a time, pick the low-hanging fruit by getting benefits, and then when it was time to reciprocate he'd kind of back off and then work on the next country. Now, Kim is really doing sort of multilateral bilateralism, and so has been effective in changing his image because people had a caricature image of him, and then sort of generating the new Gorbachev image until last week with three different kind of grumpy grams from North Korea, which I think sort of shot themselves in the foot by now undermining some of the momentum that they had generated. Then also the fact that the Olympics were in South Korea, and it enabled a senior North Korean delegation to go to the South. Even just something as simple as had the Olympics been in a different country, would we have seen as much progress or movement as we have had this year?

So that's how we got to where we are. Where are we? We're really in uncharted waters. Right now, we really don't know what's going to happen at this summit, and I can get into some scenarios closer to the end.

In recent meetings with North Koreans, even the foreign minister is unsure of what Kim is doing. I think that mirrors the U.S. situation where when the president accepted the invitation to have a summit with North Korea the advisers in the room were surprised. The South Koreans who extended the invitation were surprised. And I'm pretty sure the North Koreans were surprised.

I was in Seoul last week and it's pretty clear that the ministry of foreign affairs is unsure of what's going on. It's sort of a few people in the Blue House, their White House, who are sure of what's going on. You have three nations where only really the senior leadership knows, if that, what their leader is going to do, so it makes it harder to predict.

In going into the summit the president really has set a pretty high bar by not only criticizing but pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, as well as criticizing every previous agreement with North Korea. By definition, for the president to have a success, whatever agreement he comes up with would have to be better than the Iran deal. It would have to be better than the eight previous agreements with North Korea.

It has to be better than the 10 existing UN resolutions on North Korea, and verification would have to be equal to or better than the verification protocols we had in the START, CFE, INF and BCW treaties. So it's a pretty high bar. Anything less than

that then open the administration up to criticism of how is your deal better than the previous deals?

That raises the question of, will North Korea give up its nuclear weapons? The answer is, we don't know, but we keep speculating. From a North Korean point of view it seems like it wouldn't make sense for them to give it up. When Kim met with the South Korean delegation in March, it was very clear there was still the conditionality in there, that it wasn't just we'll put the nukes on the table.

One of the things they asked for was a security assurance. The U.S. has actually given them a number of them, including in the September 2005 Six Party Talks. That didn't prevent them from continuing to build.

Also, you kind of think, what piece of paper signed by any president would be more reassuring to them than having nuclear weapons themselves as a deterrent? Especially with the U.S. pulling out of the Iran deal, the question would be, how can we trust whatever the new North Korean deal would be? When I met with North Koreans a year ago, they said, you change your policy every four or eight years, so how could we ever trust any agreement in the future?

I said, yes, democracy is a pretty messy thing. You ought to try it sometime. That didn't go over real well. So it's sort of the question, has the nuclear leopard changed its spots? Also implicit was the U.S. must remove what they call our hostile policy. That definition sort of changes over time to fit the circumstances, but usually it's the removal of U.S. forces from the peninsula, the abrogation of the treaty, the removal of our nuclear umbrella, the removal of all UN and U.S. sanctions, and even diplomatic recognition, the insurance of companies coming in and building things, and then even things like South Korean citizens stop criticizing them or protesting them in the streets of Seoul, etcetera. It's a pretty lengthy list.

If you play it out, even if the U.S. removed all our forces, we could fly them in tomorrow. If we abrogated the treaty, we could sign one tomorrow. If we removed our nuclear umbrella, we could re-guarantee it tomorrow. If the North Koreans cut up, blow up, disassemble their missiles, their nukes, etcetera, their production facilities, it's a lot harder for them to rebuild it. So again, from a North Korean point of view, you might say, why would they do that?

How will the summit play out? I don't know. I don't think anyone knows.

Seven of the scenarios I came up with were, the first would be CBID (ph) or bust. That's sort of what Mr. Bolton is saying. We'll back up Air Force One, you put the nukes on, and if you're not willing to do that we're out of here, and it will presumably go back to talking about a preventive attack or really having maximum pressure or a long-term kind of Cold War strategy of deterrence, compellance, defense, etcetera. There have been a number of statements by Mr. Bolton, as well as some of President Trump's comments, that could indicate that that is the scenario.

Another one is what I call the art of the deal. The public statements are maximalist, but that's what you do going into a negotiation. You're willing to accept something less than that in order to have a deal.

The third one would be, to use a phrase from Mr. Trump's book, truthful hyperbole. You get something and, as he wrote in the book, everyone wants to believe they got the best, the biggest, why not let them have that? It's truthful exaggeration, it's truthful hyperbole. So you claim something that's bigger than it actually is, and we've seen some of that already. We've had Mr. Pompeo in the White House saying, North Korea is saying things they've never said before, when they're saying exactly what they've been saying for the 27 years of negotiations.

Another one would be BFF, best friends forever. You define success by establishing a relationship with Kim which could lead to a negotiated settlement later on. That would be similar to the Mar-a-Lago summit he had with Xi Jinping a year ago where he went in like a lion and came out like a lamb. It was, watch me criticize and beat up on China, and then came out with, I've established this great relationship with Xi Jinping and we'll go from there. So even now, as we're taking financial measures against China, he's still highlighting the relationship he has with Xi Jinping.

Another one would be, we got ours. That's a concern the allies have, because they've seen that the administration's primary focus has been on protecting the American homeland. There have been statements by Mr. Pompeo during his confirmation hearings, even I think last week or recently, sort of the focus of this meeting is to eliminate the threat to the American homeland.

Prime Minister Abe told the upper house of their legislature he was worried that this means that the medium- range and short-range ballistic missiles will not be a focus of the U.S.-North Korea summit, which leaves our two allies continuing under a nuclear threat, because North Korea already has nuclear capable missiles that can hit all of South Korea and Japan. I think the primary reason Abe came recently was to get a public affirmation by the president that MRBMs and SRBMs would be included, but then since then we've also seen Mr. Pompeo reiterate the focus of the meeting is the ICBMs and the IRBMs.

The last two would be enough of a success, we don't expect the president and the leader are going to come out with a 100 page incredibly detailed document. Maybe it's good enough that it seems worth having follow-ons, either summits or negotiations or meetings at lower echelons. So good enough to keep the ball in play.

And then the last one would be all the cynical, skeptical experts are totally wrong and we get everything we've ever wanted. So we'll see where we go.

Two last points, the cost of failure seems to be higher than in the past. When we had either meetings that didn't go well, or negotiations that either collapsed or

agreements that they cheated on, we kind of went back to the usual high tension or even heightened tension, nervousness about miscalculation or attacks and things escalating to an all-out conflict. It's sort of the situation on the peninsula that we've all grown to know and love, at least those of us who work it as a living. But it seems now if the summit is deemed a collapse or a failure, then we may be back to where we were even up to January, where we're talking about a preventive attack and whether that would escalate to an all-out war on the peninsula.

When I was in government, we did war games and the cost of hostilities was always hundreds of thousands of casualties, and that's before we thought they had nuclear weapons. So finally, just the uncertainty of how this summit is going to play out. It's really a situation similar to when the cardinals go into the Sistine Chapel to pick a pope.

We're going to have two leaders go in. I think the North Koreans and the U.S. officials may go like, do you know what your guy is going to say? No, I don't. Do you know what your guy is going to say? No, I don't.

So no one is really going to know how it's going to turn out, maybe even how their own leader is going to -- what cards he's going to play or how he will react to the other's hand. So they're going to go in, close the door, and the world is going to be waiting with hope and trepidation to see either white smoke or black smoke coming out of the chimney.

Thanks very much.

(Applause).

I guess we'll both be up here for questions, so either direct it to either one of us or we'll take a shot at it.

MR. HUESSY: I want both of you to reflect on this question, and you and I just talked about this. When Lyndon Johnson put together the NPT he was worried about what Kennedy had said early in his administration about proliferation. We basically have a number of countries outside the NPT, one of whom, Pakistan, gave us the Khan network.

What we have now is we have two countries, Iran and North Korea. If at the end you can't use military force in Korea because of what you and I talked about, war coming and where it goes who knows, and with Iran it's too big of a country and there are too many targets and do you want to get into a war there which won't solve the problem. So if that's the case, then you're saying anybody in the NPT who wants to get out of the NPT by becoming a nuclear power can, and you're just back to deterrence.

The question is, that's like most people who aren't in the NPT have not gone nuclear, so two out of however many countries have signed up is all you can do. So you

go to the John Hamre view which is you deter them from invading the South and you deter them from using nuclear weapons against Japan, South Korea and the United States, and you just have to live with it. Is that a fair reading of what our options are? Would a summit at least give you an answer to what door number one or door number two, which one we have to decide to open, if we open it?

MR. KLINGNER: Right, it could be if Kim comes in and says I'll never give them up or here's my laundry list of demands, and then you either say nope, that's too long a list, we're out of here; or here's our list, here's your list, do we try to make progress? If at the end of the day you feel they aren't going to give them up, then you have a choice. Do you initiate a war, do you do the maximum pressure, or do you do kind of a Cold War strategy?

So what you can say is, let's start bombing North Korea, and/or do you hit Russia first, do you hit China first, do you hit India first, do you hit Pakistan first, do you hit Israel first? So is North Korea different from the others? I mean, we've accepted Russia and China. There was talk in the '60s of attacking China, etcetera. You either have, we have to uphold the NPT, let's initiate an attack.

So some options in December and January we were hearing of were hitting two or three targets on the idea that North Korea would not respond. Now anyone who works North Korea feels they would respond, so then you have a situation of escalation or not. If you hit either two or three targets as a signal, say two or three missile targets, will that compel North Korea to give up their nuclear program and their missile programs? Or, will it lead them to hit two or three U.S. Forces Korea targets, and then where are we?

Would any U.S. president accept hundreds of American servicemen and women dead, and then do you then escalate to what could be an all-out conflict on the peninsula? It gets nasty real quickly. Or, do you say if they're not going to give them up then let's do maximum pressure. Let's go after Chinese entities that we failed to go after so far and try and change the calculus even more. Or, are you in that kind of unsatisfactory situation of Cold War compellance, deterrence, defense?

It's a very good policy debate. Do you want to, in a way, start a war to prevent a war? People will say North Korea is different than Russia or China, because Kim is crazy. He's not crazy. He's a brutal, terrible dictator, but he's not frothy-mouthed and going to wake up and start a war someday.

Then it's, they could proliferate. Well, do you start a war with North Korea to prevent a case of proliferation, or do you try to handle it through other means, which you could argue is a leaky sieve, but what do you want to do, risk a proliferation or start the war? Others are that, as Mr. McMasters said, he's a brutal, terrible dictator who does terrible things to his people, so we need to start the war with North Korea. Well, Stalin and Brezhnev and Khrushchev and Mao and others, fill in the name.

I'm not that eager to start a preventive attack which I think could easily lead to an

all-out war on the peninsula. Others will have a different view.

MR. BOSCO: I don't differ with the last statement, Bruce, that you're not eager to start a preventive war. Neither am I. Neither, I think, is any rational person.

But I think the missing link in both Peter's question and much of your answer, but not all of it, is the role of China. It's not a choice of war with North Korea or acquiescence to North Korea being a nuclear power and doing all the other terrible things it does. China is the key, it's the fulcrum, to North Korea's program. We've seen that over the years.

I think, as I said, we need to escalate the maximum pressure campaign against China. China needs to realize that it bears major responsibility for the fix we're in, and we need to start letting them pay a price. I think we have been doing that to a certain extent, and that's why we've gotten the limited cooperation we've gotten from them. But I think we need to intensify that a lot more. I don't know how this president is going to feel about his buddy Xi Jinping starting to feel the squeeze, but I think that's what we're going to have to do.

MR. : As an outcome of whatever happens, what is the likelihood that more than a hand-shake and an agreement that we look for some kind of freeze that is ratified by our Senate? What is the likelihood of something like that coming out?

MR. KLINGNER: I guess even before we get to that, I think there are recommendations or requirements we should have in an agreement. I think it's useful to lay those out ahead of time so that then when if there's a Singapore declaration you then measure it against what you've made recommendations against. You can always argue if you come up with these 10 things have to be in it, and if they come up with six or seven, is that good enough? You'll never get perfection. Or is it no, this is flawed? Again, a good policy debate.

Some of the things that I've always criticized previous North Korean agreements, and I compare them with arms control treaties with the Soviet Union -- I was chief of CIA's Arms Control staff, I was a member of the negotiating delegation overseas -- is the thing that was different was that we had very detailed treaties with the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. All the agreements with North Korea have been very short, very vague, kind of leaving vague interpretations. You really need to delineate everyone's requirements.

If you're going to buy a car from someone who has cheated you eight times, you can't just say I want to buy a car. It's like, it's got to have a carburetor. It's got to have four tires. You're really listing it. With the Soviets we had, this is what a missile is, this is how it's destroyed, etcetera.

The other thing is verification. If you don't have verification you really don't have an agreement. So again, we didn't like the Soviets. We didn't trust the Soviets.

But we had pretty good inspection, including short notice challenge inspections of non-declared facilities. If you don't have that, you don't have an agreement.

You also need to get it in writing. I think it was that great international relations expert Yogi Berra who said, oral agreements aren't worth the paper they're written on. Some of the agreements in the past have been well, the North Korean negotiator told Chris Hill this, so that's what we thought we had. Then lo and behold, we didn't have it.

We need to create a roadmap. We need a peace treaty. Before you sign that, in my view, you have to have force reductions to reduce the North Korean conventional threat to the South, like the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, along with CSBMs.

And then you have to maintain multilateralism. Too often people are putting it as a U.S.-North Korea issue. The problem with that is we're the bad cop, and you have South Korea and others sort of like, can't you just give a little bit more to keep the ball rolling and keep the ball in play? I think, unfortunately, President Moon played into that because in his summit he took upon himself the role of good cop or the parent who gives the deserts and it's wait until your father gets home and talks to you about denuclearization.

Well now we're sort of the bad guy, and I think it should have been more a case of the two of them. So I'd say, lay out what you need in an agreement, and then whatever comes out of that meeting or subsequent meetings, then you assess it like that and you hopefully avoid a lot of the partisan part where one half will say whatever Trump comes up with is wonderful, the other half will say it's awful because it's Trump. So at least you try to have some analytic aspect to it.

MR. BOSCO: I wouldn't add anything to that.

MR. : I wish you would address two things. One, why is it in Kim's interest to have economic development, with more intercourse with North Korea? He could be much more secure as a dictator, one might argue -- (off mic) -- better to have a hopelessly ameliorated population where there isn't even any kind of revolutionary movement? I'm thinking of Iran, for example. He'd be more secure that way than he would if he opened up. Look what happened when Gorbachev tried Glasnost.

The other is, I think in a deterrence situation we may be more linked with our allies and vice versa, than one might think at first blush because if the United States is perceived as decoupling its alliance, allies around the world are going to notice. If, on the other hand, the Koreans don't realize that protecting the American homeland is baseline to having any protection for Korea. If the American homeland is destroyed by an EMP attack, good luck on Korea getting help.

Also, you mentioned about medium-range missiles. It's the last thing I'll raise. If they are fired from a ship, and who says they can't put a ship in the Atlantic Ocean and

they go over the East with a Scud, they can take out 70 percent of the U.S. electric grid with a single shot. It's a lot easier to do that Scud off a ship than it is to have a monster rocket from North Korea take off where we have a return address instantly and 30 minutes to respond instead of six minutes to respond, and maybe not even able to identify who did it, and most of the damage from EMP. Can you look at some of those elements, please?

MR. KLINGNER: There's a lot of elements there. On the economic thing, Kim has promised, as his predecessors did, he's going to improve the conditions of (the public ?). What a lot of people focus on is his policy called (juche ?), which is basically guns and butter. People say this is different from his father who had a military first policy, so this shows kind of a more benign intent, etcetera.

As Kim Jong-un himself said in a 2013 speech, it's based on, and it's the same policy as one his grandfather had in a 1962 Central Committee meeting. So it's really not that different. If you've been doomed to read the last 24 years of New Year's Day speeches of North Korea, as I have been, you see that every year there's references to improving the economic condition.

So they want to improve the economy, but they're also deathly afraid of how that happens because they see the contagion of outside influence. What they've tried to do is create these literally walled off enclaves of capitalism in the country to make money to throw it over the wall to support the rest of the socialist country. They had that at Kaesong with South Korea, and they've had some other ones. That is how they would like to have economic development, that they keep control.

Even when the U.S. and others have provided food aid, and we say one of the things is you give them rice or grain in these indestructible bags and it's got the American flag on it. So as these people would keep using this bag, because it's useful, they'll see American helped us. Well, they turned that around and said, we forced the Americans to pay tribute to our leader. So every time you carry around this bag it's showing how weak the Americans are.

Anyway, the thing is like Pompeo and others are saying look, you'll get a lot of great stuff. We're going to have American businesses going throughout your country to build stuff, they see that as oh my God, that's not how we want it. If we were ever to give them assistance, we need to do it on our terms rather than just here's a check or we'll go into these enclaves. But they see that as a threat, sort of death in the long-term rather than an immediate death.

On the various military threats, yes they've got the medium-range missiles. We haven't seen any indications yet that they've put them on ships, and hopefully we can keep track of those kinds of things. Obviously that's a concern.

The decoupling is one we've heard increasingly in the last year or so. The short-hand for it is, would you really trade or risk Los Angeles for Seoul or for Tokyo. So they

are afraid, once our homeland is under threat, that we'll kind of back off in any kind of conflict.

I turn it around and say, we were willing to risk 100 million casualties in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, in essence risking LA, New York and Washington for Bonn, Paris and London. We've got a treaty, we've got presidential statements, we've got SecDef statements, and by the way we've deployed our most precious resource, 28,500 of our sons and daughters there. We're in this game. So we try to reassure them that it's not decoupling.

MR. BOSCO: I would just answer your first question, which was why would North Korea find the opportunity of economic development and prosperity as persuasive and decisive? I don't think it would be. I think what's new on the table is the concept of regime change that this administration may well -- certainly giving the message that we may well use force. And we've said some nasty things about the moral quality of that regime. So I think they're finally taking that a bit seriously.

I think Xi Jinping is too. Those Americans are crazy. They may take this morality thing and humanitarian assistance seriously and give them one more excuse to knock over this regime. So I think the threat -- for 25 years we've been offering goodies to them and we've given them goodies, and that hasn't been enough to change their behavior.

MR. : One of the central issues now is did the two sides mean the same thing by the term denuclearization? It appeared in 2005 in the Six Party Talks declarations, so it's not a new concept. It seems that what the North means is some kind of phased process that would take some period of years before they (eliminate ?) their nuclear weapons.

The two times Kim Jong-un has mentioned it recently was when he's been to China, which would seem to imply perhaps that China endorses the concept. Based on your study of past negotiations and your interaction, what do you think the North means by denuclearization and the kind of phasing they have in mind?

MR. KLINGNER: That's one of the things, that you need to define the terms, as we did with arms control treaties. The denuclearization, the phasing, isn't inherent in the word itself. They want phases, they want to drag it out, they want action for action, reward for minimal steps along the way. We want immediate, because we've gotten fed up with all the past ones.

But the word itself and the concept itself, we do have very different concepts. That is something that -- it's the conditionality that they have implied in the term, where some are interpreting the recent statements as they're ready to put the nukes on the table, and it's the hostile policy and the security assurances. But what they have also, in my discussions with North Korean and others, they see denuclearization more as global arms control rather than unilateral disarmament.

Even in some of the speeches by Kim Jong-un, I think one of the phrases he told the South Korean delegation in March, it's basically when the world goes to zero, we're there with you. We'll go to zero. So it's more, as a member of the nuclear weapons states, we sort of embrace -- they don't say it this way, but the concept of the NPT -- when all of us in the club go to zero, we're there. So they see it more as global arms control.

Another definition that we have differences of view on is the Korean Peninsula. In the Six Party Talks we didn't want to look like we're singling out North Korea, so instead of saying the denuclearization of North Korea, the negotiator agreed to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We knew half of it was already done, so that means all the focus is on the North.

They saw that as, we get inspections in the South, because either they believe there's still nukes there or they will say they still think there are nukes there so they get to have inspections. But even more broadly than that, we see the Korean Peninsula as a land mass. It's pretty easily defined. They see it as anything that impacts or influences the Korean Peninsula. So nuclear capable aircraft, including way down in Guam, that's part of the Korean Peninsula. Nuclear dual-capable aircraft --

MR. HUESSY: Like Minot, North Dakota?

MR. KLINGNER: Actually I did raise that with a the North. Nuclear-capable submarines, aircraft on aircraft carriers, etcetera, and I even said, what about ICBMs in North or South Dakota? They went, oh yeah, that too. So they see sort of anything.

If you go back to the terms they used before denuclearization it was a nuclear free zone. It's sort of this protective bubble on and around the peninsula so that we can't bring in bombers, we can't fly bombers over, we can't have carriers nearby. Does nearby include home basing in Japan? To be determined. The definitions are very important, so denuclearization, Korean Peninsula and any other number of terms, and then the timelines and the linkages all have to be really clearly delineated.

MS. : (Off mic) -- South Korean President Moon Jae-in -- (off mic).

MR. KLINGNER: I think the original purpose was to sort of coordinate prior to President Trump's meeting with Kim Jong-un. Given the three statements by North Korea last week, where it sort of removed the fig leaf of what some people thought North Korea intended, there's some reports the president was surprised, that it is perhaps not going to be as easy as he thought, that perhaps North Korea is not intending what he thought they were going to intend. So I think it may be a little bit more of a tense meeting. Whether it gets to a, I thought you told me, or whether it gets to that level, I don't know.

I think there is now, given last week's statements, more of a difference of view between South Korea and the U.S. than there was before. Thinks seemed to be kind of

moving on this happy face track, and then all of a sudden North Korea criticized the military exercises, which as Joe said, they're determined to be insulted or find a reason for criticizing. Kim Kye-gwan statement was even more definitive of no, no, no, this is what we mean by denuclearization. And then the third statement was much more critical of the South Korean regime.

When I was in Seoul I was asking, does this sort of take the bloom off the rose for you guys, the euphoric expectations that they had after the Panmunjon Declaration? They were like, no, we're still good. What we saw before the summit was the Korean public was pretty jaded, the two deadly attacks in 2010, etcetera. I think it was about 15 percent of the South Korean public saw that, yeah we can trust North Korea, we think this will work.

After the Panmunjon Declaration, where nothing has actually changed but you had this very positive day of cavorting back and forth across the military demarcation line, now I think it's 75 percent of South Koreans think we can trust North Korea and we think this will be successful. So even though nothing had really changed, except the perceptions, now you have South Korea feeling that this will work. And then the problem with the good cop, bad cop is if the summit doesn't go well with Trump and Kim, then do they blame us for torpedoing this positive momentum because we're outrageous or we're asking too much or whatever, setting the bar too high? And then, does that cause strains in the relationship? That's a concern people have.

MR. BOSCO: Just going back, Peter, to Michael Gordon's question on definitions of denuclearization, if they take the position that it is a broad as Bruce has pointed out, in other words anything that has the capability of striking North Korea with nuclear weapons has got to be a part of the negotiations, has got to go, our 7th Fleet and all the rest of it. We can turn that around and say, since China is your ally everything that China has that could hit South Korea or us is also on the table.

MR. HUESSY: And Russia.

MR. BOSCO: And Russia. So it's a cute game they're playing.

MR. HUESSY: Thank you, gentlemen.

(Applause).